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A PROPOSAL FOR A FLEXIBLE EUROPE
Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger*
I. INTRODUCTION
Entry into the European Union is regulated by three sets of formal requirements1:
- According to the “Copenhagen criteria”  new members must have a stable democracy,
follow the rule of law, observe appropriate standards of human rights, and must protect
minorities;
- They must have a functioning market economy; and most importantly
- The acceding states must agree to the obligations of EU membership which includes
adherence to the aims of political and economic union. This means that they have to fully
accept the “acquis communautaire”. This legal corpus of the EU has by now grown to a
large size, involving no less than 16,000 pages of text.
                                                
* Bruno S. Frey is professor of economics at the University of Zurich, Reiner Eichenberger is associate professor
of economics at the University of Fribourg.
2From the economic point of view, the problems created by the huge differences in income
levels between the applying countries (see Carius, Homeyer and Baer 2000) are even more
important. This is also true for the five Central and East-European Countries (CEECs), who in
the opinion of the European Council are already meeting the requirements mentioned above,
and with whom formal accession negotiations have started in March 1998, namely the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. They all have dramatically lower per
capita incomes than the present EU members. Even Portugal, the poorest present member, has
a per capita GNP of $ 11,010, compared to, for instance, Estonia with $ 3,360. The situation
is even more extreme for the other five CEECs who applied for membership (Bulgaria,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia). Romania has a per capita income of only $ 1,410,
and Bulgaria of $ 1,170.
These economic aspects are matched by the weaknesses of the decision making processes in
the EU. Thus, the integration of the CEECs is faced by four important problems:
(1) The current system of income redistribution among the EU countries, undertaken via the
Common Agricultural Policy or the Structural Funds, cannot be maintained. It would
impose too high a burden on all the present members, including those now benefiting
from the redistribution programs.
(2) The large increase in the number of member countries with even more divergent
preferences in the population necessitates new decision-making mechanisms in the
Council of Ministers and the Commission. Absent such structural changes there is a risk
of deadlock or at least of a standstill.
                                                                                                                                                        
1 See extensively Cameron 1998, Dehousse 1998, Laurent and Maresceau 1998, Wagener and Heiko 1998.
3(3) The outer-border problems of the EU do not diminish, but rather accentuate, when the
CEECs who apply for membership are forced to accept the whole acquis communautaire.
An enlarged EU would be faced with countries such as Ukraina and Belarus with an even
less developed economy. The income discrepancies at the new outer-borders would be
huge, with the consequent tensions.
(4) The basic problem of the EU, the democracy deficit, is not tackled by enlargement at all.
Rather, it is even increased. In a growing EU without fundamental institutional reforms,
the negotiation processes among the member countries become more complex and the
responsibilities more blurred. Thus, the citizens influence on politics diminishes and the
discretionary leeway of the EU decision-making bodies increases. This strengthens not
only the citizens’ resistance against enlargement of the EU, but also against its deepening.
How will the European Union respond to these challenges? A likely scenario is already partly
visible. The negotiations most probably extend over a long period, in any case much longer
than desired by the applicants. The formal conditions will be maintained but long adjustment
periods will have to be granted. Thus, the CEECs will legally be members of the Union – they
will be able to participate in its decision-making – but economically they are far from equal to
the other members. The many temporary exceptions to the “acquis communautaire” are due to
relate to many different areas. Most importantly, the free movement of labor will likely be
blocked by the present members, while the new members will ask for exemptions from the
free movement of goods, services, and capital. The challenges will therefore be solved on the
legal level only while the underlying economic problems of integration will remain unsolved.
Most probably, the political structure of the EU will not be fundamentally changed, but only
the weights of the countries in the decision procedures will be somewhat adjusted, and the
requirements of unanimity and qualified majorities will be somewhat softened. The discussion
on the democracy deficit, finally, is rather crowded out by the strong focus on enlargement.
4As long as the enlargement process is going on, the resources needed for reforms are bound in
this process and it is unlikely that the democratic institutions and, thus, the citizens’ political
influence are effectively strengthened. On the whole, this scenario suggests that the European
Union proceeds by “muddling through” instead of squarely facing the problems of enlarged
membership.
This paper suggests a basically different approach guided by economic principles. While it
strongly deviates from rather haphazard muddling through, our proposal is not utopian at all
but is immediately applicable to EU enlargement.
Our basic idea is that there should be the possibility of partial entry into the European Union
rather than the all or none decision to accept the whole acquis communautaire at one stroke.
Following our proposal, the CEECs should have the option of entering with respect to
functions where they expect positive net benefits, and to stay out with respect to functions
where this is not the case. Potential entrants should thus be able to act according to their
willingness to pay, or implicit demand curve, with respect to the various relevant functions. In
order to enable such partial entry, a new type of jurisdictions called FOCJ is proposed
between the EU, the CEECs, and beyond. These functional jurisdictions are not to be imposed
from above but should emerge as the result of the voluntary negotiations between the new
partners. To the extent the CEECs develop (partly because of the existence of these flexible
partnerships) an increasing number of such FOCJ with different members and functions will
arise so that an ever closer integration will take place. With FOCJ, variable geometry is a
desirable feature of integration rather than a shortcoming. It goes much beyond the proposal
for a multi-speed integration of some “chosen” countries into a “core Europe” (as recently
proposed by the German foreign minister Fischer), or the special cases of the treaties of
Schengen and of the Economic and Monetary Union EMU which not all EU member
countries need to join.
5II. THE PROPOSAL: FOCJ
The jurisdictions here proposed to facilitate the integration of the CEECs with the European
Union have four essential characteristics. FOCJ is the acronym for:
• Functional (F), i.e. the new jurisdictions extend over areas defined by the tasks to be
fulfilled;
• Overlapping (O), i.e. in line with the many different tasks (functions) there are
corresponding governmental units straddling areas belonging to the various CEECs and the
EU;
• Competing (C), i.e. communities in the CEECs and the EU may choose to which functional
jurisdictions they want to belong. Moreover, these jurisdictions are governed by democratic
mechanisms. They may be based on the representation of voters or the voters may express
their preferences directly via initiatives and referenda;
• Jurisdictions (J), i.e. the units straddling the CEECs and the EU are governmental in the
sense that they have enforcement power and can, in particular, levy taxes.
FOCJ are based on theoretical propositions advanced in the economic theory of federalism.
They nevertheless form a governmental system completely different to the one suggested in
that literature. While the economic theory of federalism analyzes the behavior of given
political units at the different levels of government, FOCJ emerge in response to the
geography of the problems of integration.2
                                                
2 The concept of  FOCJ is extensively discussed in Frey and Eichenberger (1999). Similar ideas can already been
found in by Montesquieu (1749). Burnheim (1985) mentions similar elements. In the economics literature a
6The four elements of FOCJ are now related to economic theory as well as to existing federal
institutions, pointing out both similarities and differences to existing concepts.
A. Functions
A particular public service, which benefits a certain geographical area, should be financed by
the people living in that area, i.e. there should be no spill-overs. The different governmental
units can cater for regional differences in the populations' preferences or, more precisely, to
its demands. To minimize cost, these units have to exploit economies of scale in production.
As the latter may strongly differ between functions (e.g., between schools, police,
environmental policy or defense), there is an additional reason for uni-functional (or few-
functional3) governmental units of different sizes. This is the central idea of “fiscal
equivalence” as proposed by Olson (1969) and Oates (1972). This endogeneity of the size of
governmental units constitutes an essential part of FOCJ. However, fiscal equivalence theory
has been little concerned with decision-making within functional units. The supply process is
either left unspecified or it is assumed that the mobility of persons (and of firms, a fact rarely
mentioned) automatically induces these units to cater for individual preferences.
B. Overlaps
FOCJ may overlap in two respects: (i) FOCJ catering to different functions may overlap; (ii)
two or more FOCJ catering even for the same function may geographically intersect (e.g., a
multitude of school FOCJ may exist in the same geographical area). A political unit normally
                                                                                                                                                        
related concept has been pioneered by Tullock (1994), who calls it 'sociological federalism'. Casella and Frey
(1992) discuss the concept and refer to relevant literature.
3 If there are strong economies of scope dominating the economies of scale, a FOCUS (which is taken to be the
singular of FOCJ) may cover more than one function.
7belongs to various FOCJ at the same time. FOCJ need not be physically contiguous, and they
need not have a monopoly over a certain area of land. Thus, this concept completely differs
from archaic nationalism with its fighting over pieces of land. It also breaks with the notion of
federalist theory that units at the same level may not overlap. On the other hand, in this
respect it is similar to Buchanan's (1965) “clubs” which may intersect.
C. Competition
The heads of FOCJ are induced to conform closely to their members' preferences by two
mechanisms: while the member units’ possibilities to exit mimics market competition
(Hirschman 1970), the citizens’ right to vote establishes political competition (see Mueller
1989). It should be noted that in FOCJ exit does not depend on migration. The citizens of a
political unit can discontinue membership in a particular FOCUS and perhaps enter a new one
without changing their location. Moreover, exit is not restricted to political units as a whole;
parts of them may also exercise this option.
Exit of member units in the form of secession has been suggested as an important ingredient
for a future European constitution (Buchanan 1991, European Constitutional Group 1993).
The right to secede stands in stark contrast to the prevailing concepts of nation states and
federations where this is strictly forbidden and often prevented by force. Current European
treaties do not provide for the secession of a nation from the European Union, and a fortiori
for part of a nation. However, exit in a system of FOCJ is a much broader concept than
secession. While secession in the traditional sense is always total, i.e. refers to all functions,
exit with FOCJ is partial, i.e. refers to only one or few functions.
For FOCJ to establish competition between governments, exit should be as unrestrained as
possible but if a negative external cost is imposed on the remaining members, an exit price
8has to be levied. Similarly, entry need not necessarily be free. As for individuals in Buchanan-
type clubs, a price may be asked for joining a particular FOCUS. The existing members of the
particular FOCUS have to democratically decide whether a new member pays an adequate
entry price and thus is welcome. As long as competition among FOCJ is not strong enough to
enforce efficient pricing, the entry and exit prices have to be monitored by an independent
body.
Competition also needs to be furthered by political institutions, as the exit option does not
suffice to induce governments to act efficiently. The citizens should directly elect the persons
managing the FOCJ, and may even be given the right to initiate popular referenda on specific
issues. These democratic institutions are known to raise efficiency in the sense of caring well
for individual preferences (for elections, see Downs 1957, Mueller 1989; for popular
referenda, see Frey 1994, Frey and Stutzer 2000, Eichenberger 1999).
D. Jurisdictions
A FOCUS is a democratic governmental jurisdiction with authority over its citizens, including
the power to tax. The lowest political unit (normally the community) is a member, and all
corresponding citizens automatically become citizens of the FOCJ to which their community
belongs. They have to carry the taxes to finance the public services provided by a particular
FOCUS.
III. FOCJ AND EU-ENLARGEMENT
A. The General Point
FOCJ allow for differentiated, tailor-made integration. Thus, they contrast strongly with the
acquis communautaire which stands for equalized integration. With FOCJ, countries and
9regions can search for cooperation in those functions in which they have a real demand for
cooperation, and they are not forced into cooperation with respect to functions on which they
want to stand alone. However, FOCJ do not lead to less integration than the acquis
communautaire for three reasons. First, FOCJ decrease the price of integration to the citizens,
and, thus, increase the demand for integration as they make integration more efficient and the
citizens democratic influence to grow. Second, thank to FOCJ integration of the CEECs is no
more a question of “all or nothing”. The countries which are not able to make it quickly to the
acquis communautaire can be integrated more closely with FOCJ than without. Third, a
FOCUS may aim at stronger integration with respect to its specific function than the acquis.
Of course, differentiated integration is not a totally new concept. Today’s standard procedure
of integration of new member countries also entails some differentiation as the countries are
granted different adaptation periods. These, however, are only looked at as temporary
exceptions and unwelcome deviations from the current normal of the acquis. They do neither
allow for stronger integration with respect to some functions, nor do they give the new
entrants the right to search for different degrees of integration with a special selection of
today’s members. Moreover, the concept of FOCJ goes much beyond a partial integration via
treaties. It provides for a common government composed of all the members. The extended
rights of political codetermination strengthen identification and provide the basis for
solidarity among the members.
B. Multiple Opportunities
Three kinds of FOCJ can be distinguished:
(a) FOCJ formed by communes and regions of some EU-member and non-member states.
This is a new form of cross border cooperation. A pertinent example refers to local
10
environmental degradation, say water pollution. One or several communes of, e.g.,
Hungary, Slovenia and Austria may form an environmental FOCUS. The government of
the FOCUS will be elected by the citizens of all the communes involved. The FOCUS is
responsible for water quality in the area, will set the standards best meeting the
preferences of all the citizens and will impose the taxes necessary to reach these goals.
The Hungarian and Slovenian communes can therewith adopt an environmental standard
higher than that generally obtaining in the rest of their nations. Such an institutional
arrangement is also advantageous for the respective Austrian communes because of the
negative spillovers connected with Hungarian and Slovenian emissions.
(b) FOCJ formed by some EU-member and non-member states. An example is the perceived
thread of cheap labor flowing in great numbers into Germany. With present arrangements,
the German government put under pressure by its trade unions is likely to block a full
scale entry of Poland into the EU. Although other present EU members are much less
concerned about this presumed danger, Germany will push through very long protection
against such cheap labor immigrating the EU. Under the regime here suggested, the other
members of the EU and Poland can integrate their labor markets in a FOCUS. This allows
Poland and these other countries to exploit their international comparative advantage.
Poland supplies its relatively abundant labor, and the others their abundant real and human
capital. The members of the labor mobility FOCUS experience a welfare gain compared
to the Germans inhibiting full integration according to the acquis communautaire.
(c) FOCJ formed by all the EU-member and non-member states. The CEECs and the EU
have a common interest in fighting against transnational mafia-type activities. Today, this
problem is approached in a purely technocratic way via EUROPOL and INTERPOL,
often with very limited success. A police FOCUS comprising nations affected brings
about a more efficient anti-mafia policy because governance and taxation are matched.
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The FOCUS allows  deploying the police resources in the areas where they are most
effectively used. In contrast, the EU does not know any joint police forces, not even for
special purposes. Such a police FOCUS would thus go beyond the integration now
existing in the EU. Obviously, such a FOCUS can also partially integrate countries
beyond the CEECs, Russia or North-African countries being examples.
C. Meeting the Challenges
By making use of the concept of FOCJ, the four main challenges faced by an enlarging EU
can be successfully addressed.
(1) Income redistribution. FOCJ reduce the problems connected with redistribution via two
channels. First, the demand for receiving subsidies by the today’s members of the EU is
reduced because with FOCJ it is feasible to cooperate mainly with respect to those
functions which yield particular high benefits of cooperation. The CEECs are not forced
to compromise on functions from which they do not profit much, or even lose, when
accepting the acquis communautaire. Therefore they need less compensation.
Second, it is likely that the full entry of some or all CEECs is blocked by those members
which would lose from a new targeting of redistributive flows. With FOCJ, instead, a
particular CEEC and the EU can establish a redistribution FOCUS acceptable to all
present EU members.
(2) EU decision-making structure. Those present EU-members which do not agree with the
partial admission of one or several CEECs can opt out instead of having to use their veto
power. Thus, the presently existing decision-making mechanism in the EU need not be
changed.
12
(3) Outer-border problems. The use of FOCJ allows a differentiated expansion of the EU
instead of a strict rupture towards non-EU countries. This is achieved in two ways:
First, a CEEC may enter EU partially, i.e. with respect to some functions, only.
Second, the CEECs as well as EU member countries and may establish FOCJ with
countries which are not considered as prospective members of the EU (such as Ukraine,
Belarus, and Russia).
(4) Democracy deficit. The FOCJ established are based on democratic principles and
therefore overcome the democracy deficit widely attributed to the EU.
IV. EVALUATING FOCJ
FOCJ compare favorably to the traditional form of integration as undertaken in the EU. One
aspect concerns the governments' incentives and possibilities to satisfy heterogeneous
preferences of individuals. Due to the concentration on one functional area, the citizens of a
particular FOCUS have better information on its activity, and are in a better position to
compare its performance to other governments. As many benefits and costs extend over a
quite limited geographic area, many FOCJ are likely to be small. The strengthened exit option
is also an important means to make one's preferences known to governmental suppliers.
On the other hand, FOCJ are able to provide public services at low cost because they are
formed in order to minimize interjurisdictional spillovers and to exploit economies of scale.
When the benefits of a specific activity indivisibly extend over large areas, and there are
decreasing cost, the corresponding optimal FOCUS may straddle many communities of CEEC
and EU countries. It may also be envisaged that several nations establish FOCJ. Such FOCJ
then resemble the institutions of closer integration in the form of the treaties of Schengen and
of the EMU. They differ, however, as FOCJ are democratic and impose their own taxes.
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The threat of dissatisfied member units to exit the FOCUS, and the benefit of new units
joining, gives an incentive to take individual preferences into account and to provide the
public services efficiently. Quite another advantage of FOCJ is that they open up the
politicians' cartel (“classe politique”) to functionally competent outsiders. While all-purpose
jurisdictions attract politicians and administrators with broad and non-specialized knowledge,
in FOCJ, persons with a well-grounded knowledge in a particular functional area (say
university education or health care) are successful.
A web composed of FOCJ certainly affects the role of the nation within both CEECs and the
EU. Existing nations will certainly lose functions. On the other hand, the scheme does not
purport to do away with nations but allows for multi-national as well as small scale
alternatives where they are desired by the citizens. Nation states subsist in so far as they
provide functions efficiently according to the voters' preferences.
In two countries functional, overlapping and competing jurisdictions exist to some degree (see
Frey and Eichenberger 1999, p. 49-53). They do not in all cases meet all the requirements of
FOCJ specified above but they nevertheless show that democratic functional jurisdictions are
viable. In the United States, single-purpose governments in the form of special districts play a
significant role. In Switzerland, many cantons have a structure of overlapping and competing
functional jurisdictions that share many features of FOCJ. The example from Switzerland -
which is generally considered to be a well organized and administered country - suggests that
a multiplicity of functional jurisdictions under democratic control is not a theorist’s wishful
thinking but has worked well in reality.
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IV. COMPARISON TO OTHER PROPOSALS
FOCJ differ in many crucial respects from other proposals for a future European constitution.
One of the most prominent is Buchanan (1991) who stresses individual nation's right to
secede but, somewhat surprisingly, does not build on Buchanan-type clubs. The European
Constitutional Group (1993) focuses on the example of the American constitution, and
presents constructivist proposals with respect to the houses of parliament and the respective
voting weights of the various countries. Overlapping jurisdictions and referenda are not
allowed for, and the exit option is strongly restricted. Other economics scholars (e.g.,
Blöchliger and R. L. Frey 1992, Schneider 1992) suggest a strengthening of federalism in the
traditional sense (i.e. with multi-purpose federal units) but do not envisage overlapping
jurisdictions. The report by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (1993, 1995) shortly
raises the idea of overlapping, not geographically based jurisdictions but it is not
institutionally worked out, the need for a democratic organization and the power to tax is not
acknowledged, and the idea is not applied to the problem of integration into the European
Union.
FOCJ are also quite different from the regions envisaged in existing European treaties and
institutions (see, e.g., Adonis and Jones 1991). A major difference is that FOCJ emerge from
below while the 'European regions' tend to be established from above. Moreover, their
existence strongly depends on the subsidies flowing from the European Union and the nation
states (Sharpe 1993). In contrast, the concept of FOCJ corresponds to Hayek's (1960) non-
constructivist process view. It cannot a priori be determined from outside and from above
which FOCJ will be efficient in the future. This must be left to the competitive democratic
process taking place at the level of potential member units. The central European constitution
must only make sure that no other government units, in particular the nations, obstruct the
emergence of FOCJ. In contrast to Hayek, however, the scheme allows for a (closely
15
restricted) set of central regulations, in particular the Copenhagen criteria mentioned at the
beginning of this paper.
“Subsidiarity” as proclaimed in the Maastricht Treaty is generally recognized to be more a
vague goal than a concept with content (see, e.g., Centre for Economic Policy Research 1993:
19-23). Even if subsidiarity were taken seriously, it would not lead to a real federal structure
because many (actual or prospective) members of the European Union are essentially unitary
states without federal subunits of significant competence (examples are the Netherlands,
France or Sweden). The “regions” existing in the European Union (examples are Galicia and
Cataluña in Spain, or South Tyrol and Sicily in Italy) are far from being units with significant
autonomous functional and fiscal competencies.
The Council of Ministers is a European decision making institution based on federal
principles (but nations only are represented) and organized according to functional principles
(or at least according to the corresponding administrative units). However, this Council is
only indirectly democratic (the ministers are members of governments which are
democratically legitimized by the representative system) and the deliberations are not public.
Exit from the European Union is not formally regulated, and exceptions to specific aspects of
agreements reached (as in the Maastricht Treaty concerning the European Monetary Union
and the Protocol on Social Policy, or in the Schengen Treaty concerning the free movement of
persons) are granted reluctantly. Indeed, they are seen as damaging the “spirit of Europe”.
Whether differential degrees of European integration are framed as models of “variable
geometry”, “multi-track”, “multi-speed”, “two-tier”, “hard core”, “concentric circles”, or as
“Europe à la carte”, it always evokes fierce opposition. In a system of FOCJ, in contrast,
functional units not covering everyone are taken as a welcome expression of heterogeneous
demands among European citizens.
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
FOCJ provide a feasible institutional procedure to integrate the Central and East-European
Countries into the European Union. At present, the politicians governing the European Union
insist that these nations fully accept the “acquis communautaire” though their economic and
institutional development differs drastically from those of the present member states. FOCJ
allow for partial integration on the basis of economic efficiency and democratic rules. The
functional jurisdictions proposed to straddle areas of the CEECs and the European Union may
not only overcome the huge economic and financial obstacles but may also introduce a
democratic element which is most welcome in the face of the much discussed “democratic
deficit” attributed to the EU.
FOCJ may also be used to straddle communes situated in two or more member states of the
European Union. Such FOCJ would make a substantial contribution to the coming together of
Europe at a level directly benefiting the citizens. Such jurisdictions would certainly strongly
contribute to the emergence of a “European spirit”.
Decentralized, overlapping political units have been an important feature of European history.
Many scholars attribute the rise of Europe to this diversity and competition of governmental
units, which fostered technical, economic and artistic innovation (see, e.g., Hayek 1960, Jones
1981, Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986, Weede 1993). A fully fledged adaptation of the model of
Functional, Overlapping, and Competing Jurisdictions would lead to a federal net of units
with widely different tasks and geographical extensions. If based on FOCJ, a United Europe
would no longer be associated with a centralized bureaucratic body but with variety and, thus,
the basis of the success of Europe.
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